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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
NATHAN SEAMONS as the surviv-
ing partner of SEAMONS & LOVE-
LAND. 
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, 
-vs-
LARRY D. ANDERSON and 
HANS P. ANDERSON. 
Defendants and Appellants. 
and RICHARD PETERSON. 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and 
RAY BITTERS, Co-Partners. doing 
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Case No. 7691 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appeal of the Andersons is confined to the 
record without the transcript of the evidence. For our 
purpose, however, it is necessary to state the facts not 
only from the record relied on by the appellants but 
upon the evidence transcribed by the reporter. 
In regard to the appellants Andersons observations 
of fact contained in their ·brief as to the Court allowing 
J>eterson, as cross-complainant, to amend his pleading 
so as to ask for pecuniary relief against said Andersons, 
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it will be ob~erved that while through an inadvertaney 
we failed to ask for such relief in our amended cross-
complaint, we did do so in our first (pp. 10). The An~ 
dersons were given leave to amend their pleading (tr. 
34 7), but failed to avail themselves of the opportunity. 
The transcript of the evidence shows by Andersons' 
own testimony that they still owed $117.00 on the $267.00 
postdated check (tr. 199 exhibit A2), and the findings 
of the Court show that they knew of the agreement be-
tween the Valley Car Market and Peterson (pp. 113 
paragraph 18 <?f the findings), and which. they do not 
attack. 
As to the issue not being formed by the pleadings 
as urged by counsel for the Andersons, we believe it 
is sufficient to point out that sub-paragraph b of Rule 
15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on page 24 thereof 
reads : ' 'When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall ·be treated in all respects as if they have been raised 
in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion by any party at any time, even after judgment, 
but failure to so amend does not affect· the result of 
the trial of these issues."SEE ALSO RULE 54 1 
Counsel for the Andersons points out also that no-
thing was said in the Peterson brief in the Court below 
as to the Andersons being indebted to Peterson. Counsel 
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fails to observe that we said at the end of that brief that 
n1ore points could be raised or discussed but we could 
carry the same in argtunent before the Court, which we 
did. 
\Y.ith these added observations as to the Anderson~ 
statement of fact, so far as they are not here modified, 
they are substantially correct. 
Plaintiff Seamons a s a p p e 11 a n t relates, finally 
filed a second amended complaint (pp. 40) whereby 
a1nong other things he sought, so far as this counter-
clainlant is concerned, to have him set forth his claim 
as to the Mercury car which Peterson had placed in the 
hands of the Market for purposes of sale. 
The facts as we further see them are that the Mar-
ket was to sell the Mercury for Peterson, with the stip-
ulation and understanding that the Market was to have 
all over the sum of $1950.00 that they received from the 
car (tr. 45, 247, 248, 249, 250), and only when Peterson 
had received in his own hands the said $1950.00 was 
title to pass to the buyer, and only when he received said 
money was he to acknowledge his signature before a 
Notary Public on the certificate of title ( tr. 250). 
Notwithstanding this agreement, Peterson receiv-
ed only $1300.00 through Mr. Neilsen of the $1400.00 
that Neilsen recieved from Seamons, and later received 
$100.00 more when the Market, through Neilsen, got a 
$150.00 check from Larry Anderson to take up the post-
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dated check of $267.00. This is admitted in the Market's 
brief. Thus Peterson received a total of $1400.00 leav-
Ing a balance of $550.00 due him. 
It will be observed from this statement that we dis-
agree with the statement of counsel for Nielsen and Bit-
ters as to who was taking the chance. on the Packard 
car and as to what it might bring on resale; and we 
further point out the fact that the pleading of the Mar~ 
ket ( pp. 53) does not deny the allegations contained 
in paragraph 2 of Peterson's cross-complaint that 
Peterson was to have $1950.00 before the Market was to 
have anything at all (pp. 50); and it may be further 
pointed out that the jury further found in the advisory 
verdict to question No. 3 submitted to them that Peter-
son stated to Nielsen when he handed the title to hiln 
that said Nielsen was not to deliver the same until he, 
Peterson, had actually received $1950.00 in money (pp. 
76). 
That plaintiff and cross-appellant Seamons knew 
of the arrangement whereby title was not to pass until 
Peterson had received the full amount of $1950.00 was 
found by the jury in answering question No. 8 (pp. 
77). Notwithstanding this knowledge, Seamons placed 
his notary stamp and signature upon the certificate of 
title without any authorization from Peterson ( tr. 134, 
Peterson exhibit .2), in an attempt to take title out of 
Peterson without the conditions imposed having been met. 
Seamons did this some weeks after making a purported 
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loan to Andersons, the appellants, who purported to 
give the l\lercury as security (tr. 10), and as mentioned 
before, cross appellant Nielsen put one hundred dollars 
of this in his own pocket and gave Peterson $1300.00 
(tr. 249, 250). This is perhaps an abbreviated state-
ment facts, but in the discusion in support of our points 
and in defense to claims by the other parties to the 
action, we will enlarge thereon. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. That the Court erred in making and entering 
paragraph 1 of its judgment, dated April 9th, 1951, limit-
ing defendant and cross appellant, Richard Peterson, re-
covery against cross-appellees Ray Bitters and Clayton 
Nielsen, severally and jointly to the sum of $300.00 and 
failing to award the sum of $550.00 to this cross- appel-
lant, Richard Peterson, against said parties severally 
and jointly. 
2. In making and entering paragraph 2 of its judg-
ment limiting Richard Peterson, cross-appellant, to the 
sum of $117.00 against Larry D. Anderson and Hans P. 
Anderson severally and jointly and failing to award the 
sum of $550.00 to this cross-appellant, Richard Peterson, 
against said parties severally and jointly. 
3. In making and entering paragraph three of its 
judgment limiting cross-appellant, Richard Peterson, 
to the sum of $25.00 against plaintiff, Nathan Seamons, 
and failing to award judgment in the sum of $550.00 
against said Seamons severally and jointly with Ray 
Bitters and Clayton E. Nielsen in favor of said Richard 
Peterson. 
4. In making and entering paragraph 4 of said 
judgment awarding title to the Mercury and Packard 
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cars and the proceeds on the sales therefrom to Nathan 
Searnons without giving this cross-appellant a lien on 
said earH to the arnount of $550.00. 
5. ·sy making and entering conclusions number 1, 
2and 3 limiting the same to $300.00, $117.00 and $25.00 
respectively as to the amounts recoverable by cross-
appellant~ Richard Peterson, as against Clayton E. Niel-
sen, Ray Bitters, Hans P. Anderson and Larry D. An-
derson and Nathan Seamons respectively, and failing 
to conclude that said Richard P'eterson was entitled 
to a judgment against said parties jointly and severally 
in the sum of $550.00 and . entitling said Richard Peter-
son to a lien on the above mentioned Mercury and Pack-
ard cars up to that sun1. 
6. By making and entering conclusion number 6 
concluding that $300.00, $117.00 and $25.00 is equivalent 
to the sum of $550.00 and only these sums should be 
awarded to said Richard Peterson, and failing to award 
said Richard Peterson the sum heretofore stated. 
7. The Court erred in submitting question num-
ber 2 to the jury in that the defendants Ray Bitters 
and Clayton Nielsen in their answer to cross-appellent's 
Amended Cross-Complaint admitted the sum of $1950.00 
was the sum to be paid said Richard Peterson before 
they were entitled to any money on said agreement 
heretofore found in findings of fact by the Court and 
as alleged in said Peterson's Amended Answer and 
Cross-Complaint. 
8. The Court erred in failing to find in its Finding 
of Fact that plaintiff, Nathan Seamons, and defendants, 
Ray Bitters and Clayton Nielsen, were jointly and sev-
erally indebted to said Richard Peterson in the sum 
of $550.00 or in lieu thereof, the owner of said Mercury 
and Packard cars or $550.00 of the proceeds from the 
sale thereof. 
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.A.RGUMENT 
Point8 1 to 8 
~-\.11 th~8e point8, "·~ believe, can be discussed to-
gether as they all go to the n1atter of the Court limit- / 
ing cross-appellant, Richard Peterson, recovery against 
all other parties to this action severally and Jointly 
short of $550.00, the su1n 've claim is due and owing 
J>eterson. 
Referring this Court to our Statement of Facts 
as our starting point in this argument in support of what 
\\~e believe the cause shows by the evidence, we con-
tinue thus: That there was some talk between Richard 
Peterson and the Market about Peterson taking the An-
dersons' Packard for $425.00 ( tr. 248), Peterson test-
ifying that the l\larket was to take the chance of resale 
since he wanted $1950.00 and no Packard (tr. 248), and 
no authority was sought or given Market to repair 
the Packard by Market's own admission (tr. 299). The 
trade was made by the Market, allowing Andersons . 
$425.00 on the Packard and Larry Anderson giving a 
postdated check of $267.00. (This check is spoken of 
as the $270.00 in the evidence (exhibit No. 4, Tr. 249.)) 
Shortly thereafter, the Market traded the Packard to 
Mr. Darley of Wellsville, obtaining an old Chrysler 
valued at $150.00 by Nielsen, and $300.00 in cash ( tr. 26, 
cross-appellant's exhibit 3). (We take the testimony 
as controlling over exhibit 3 as to cash received). 
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We believe that question No. 2 (pp. 76) was erron-
eously subn1itted to the jury in view of Market's plead-
ings ( pp. 53), as they do not deny the agreement set up 
in paragrapr1 2 of Cross-Appellant's Cross-Complaint 
(pp. ~0) as to cross-appellant Peterson's allegation that 
the Market was to have all over $1950.00, and Market 
is therefore concluded by said answer, for it certainly 
does not confor1n to sub-paragraph b of Rule 8, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. But assuming for the pur-
pose of argument only, that the question was properly 
submitted to the jury and further assuming that the 
~f arket had the right to sell the Packard, nowhere is 
there any evidence to support their action in trading for 
the old Chrysler car or any car as part down payment 
on the Packard. A right to sell is not a right to trade. 
So if we take the question as having been properly sub-
mitted and answered by the jury it still does not aid the 
Market for they took the Packard and without author-
ity fro1n Peterson proceeded to make a trade with Dar-
ley for a worthless old car in order that they might en-
rich themselves $300.00 and which was a conversion if 
the Packard belonged to Peterson. But we maintain 
that the jury could not find any other answer nor could 
the court to said question No. 2 than that of "yes" 
because of said sub-paragraph b of said rule 8. 
The Packard admittedly was worth $450.00 as it 
1s shown by exhibit No. 3. Under this state of facts, 
Peterson was certainly entitled to $425.00 ~ and we be-
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lieYe it cannot be properl~· disputed that Peterson was 
entitled to receive at lea.~t $425.00, the price at which 
the Packard \Yas taken in ( tr. 26 ~ exhibit 3) ; and so 
n1uch n1ore as evidenced by the posdated check of Larry 
Anderson to n1ake the $1950.00. All above that sum 
belonged to ~Iarket, but l\Iarket proceeded to take their 
conunissions before Peterson had been fully paid as is 
sho,vn in their brief, and their own testimony given 
in Court (tr. 58). It is admitted in the Market's 
brief that the l\[arket took $100.00 out of finance money 
and $50.00 out of the $150.00 check given to Nielsen by 
Larry ..... ,t\.nderson in order to cancel the said $267.00 check. 
That the ~1arket was not entitled to any commission for 
sale of the Mercury before payment to Peterson of 
$1950.00 is clear even under their own statement of the 
case, yet they took it. 
That the Market proceeded to finance the Packard 
with Seamons in order to sell and trade with Darley 
without first obtaining authority from Peterson is an-
other fact (we assume here that the Packard was Peter-
son's for purpose of argument only) and which is cer-
tainly controlling evidence to show that the Market 
considered that they could sell or trade the Packard 
or do anything else that they desired. In connection 
with this, it may be further observed that Peterson 
never saw the Packard before the deal ( tr. 42.) This 
comes from Nielsen himself. Nielsen further testified 
that the deal was for $1950.00 (tr. 42, 43), as also did 
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J>eterson (tr. 264), who further testified that he was 
dealing with the Market only and didn't even know who 
bought the Mercury until after the deal (tr. 264). And 
further that he knew nothing of the postdated check 
until May 23, 1949 (tr. 267). However it was May 6th, 
l!lJ!) that Nielsen was paid the $150.00 check by Larry 
Anderson with the understanding that the $270.00 check 
was to be destroyed. Nielsen instead or destroying the 
check held it until about August 15th, 1949 ( tr. 268), 
when he gave it to Peterson, though he kne"\\T it was 
worthless, and had not even taken the trouble to endorse 
it. 
Another significant fact is that when Larry An-
derson decided not to go through with the Mercury mat-
ter, he made a bill of sale to ~Iarket dated May 26, 1949 
(Anderson exhibit "A"), which was the same date that 
Nielsen through false representation got the certificate 
of title from Peterson ( tr. 250), and the date when the 
l\J ercury deal was called off according to Nielsen him-
self ( tr. 35). 
We believe all this goes to show, assuming that 
question No. 2 was properly put to the jury, that the 
finding of the jury is not supported by any substantial, 
believeable evidence, and the finding of the jury and 
Court should have been ''Yes'' as to Peterson receiving 
$1950.00 regardles~ of what the Packard sold for. But 
regardless of that, the Packard did sell for more than 
$425.00 as heretofore pointed out, and the Market was 
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accountable to Peterson for $1950.00. 
The plaintiff and Cross-.... \ppellant, Sean1ons, never 
relied on any indicia of title that Anderson had to the 
~fercury is conclusivelv established (tr. 197). He had 
. . 
never seen the title and only became interested in it when 
the finance co1npany \\canted it and Seamons got it 
through Nielsen, Nielsen telling Peterson that the An-
dersons wanted the title in order to get plates for the 
~Iercury (tr. 250), and at which time the Andersons had 
already notified Nielsen that they did not want the car 
(tr. 35). This culminated in a bill of sale from Ander-
son to :Jlarket, dated 1Iay 23rd, 1949, the same date, as 
will be observed, that Nielsen received title from Peter-
son (tr. 250). 
That Sean1ons knew of the agreement with the 
\'alley Car Market is we believe substantiated by the 
evidence, and there seems to be no doubt that there 
were close ties existing between the Market and appellant 
Seamons ( tr. 250; 251; 252;), which shows they were 
working together as against Peterson. The finding 
of the jury is fully supported by the evidence in ans-
wering No. 8 of the questions submitted which read, 
''Did Seamons and Loveland know of the terms of the 
original verbal agreement between Richard Petersen 
and the Valley Car Market covering the Mercury car 
within a day or so of the transaction~'' Answer ''yes'' 
or "no". Answer, Yes (pp. 77). It may be added that 
~Jarket was selling cars for Seamons (tr. 257). 
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Going to the question as to when title to the Mer-
eury car was to pass, the Court submitted the following 
questjon No. 3: ''Did Richard Peterson ever state to 
C1layton Nielsen and or Ray Bitters, in substance as 
. ' 
hP Higned the certificate of ownership on the Mercury 
and handed saine to Nielsen, that said certificate was 
not to be delivered until said Richard Peterson had 
receivde $1950.00 in money~" Answer "Yes" or "No". 
Answer : Yes ( tr. 7 6). We believe this is very fully 
supported by the evidence ( tr. 250), and when the !{ar-
ket took the certificate they were duty bound to pay 
Peterson the $1950.00 upon its delivery to any other 
person, which they admittedly did by delivering said 
certificate to Seamons ; and this is so regardless of any 
agreement that they had before. This would seem to 
follow as a matter of law. That the conditional de-
livery of the certificate of title came after April 24th 
cannot be doubted ( tr. 250, 295). 
As to any contention that appellant Seamons might 
Inake as having a claim against Peterson, we must keep 
in 1nind that Sean1ons knew of the deal between Peter-
son and Market and that Larry Anderson himself de-
clared that he was not to have title until the Mercury 
had been paid for ( tr. 196), nor did he think the deal 
was completed (tr. 207, 208). Then too, Seamons did not 
even have the certificate of title to the Mercury car until 
weeks after the money was loaned to the Andersons' 
the money to be paid to Peterson (tr. 250), for he 
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could not have had it before May 23rd, 1949, thP rlay· 
Nielsen received it fron1 Peterson. The evidence fur-
ther sho"ys that Seamons put his o'Yn notary statnp on 
the certificate of title "ithout authorization ( tr. 253), 
and that he retained the certificate until Peterson dis-
covered the unauthorized notary (tr. 253) and regained 
the same. 
Thereafter, in order to avoid trouble, and comprom-
ise the matter ( tr. 251), Peterson offered to give Sea-
nlons what Seamons actually had in the Mercury. Sea-
mons refused this offer and demanded all finance 
charges, insurance and other charges. This of course 
Peterson refused, preferring to stand on his legal rights 
(tr. 252). 
The errors here complained of as coming from the 
Court in its findings, conclusions and judgment are 
therefore well bottomed. 
We respectively say that the Court below erred 
in not granting Peterson, a joint and several judgment 
against all the other parties, as the Court found. that 
they all knew that no title was to pass from Peterson 
until he actually received $1950.00. And if this is true, 
that is, that all the parties knew of such an agreement 
between the Valley Car Markt and Peterson then neither 
or any of them can have any claim against him as they 
will evidently try to maintain. To this effect is 57 -3a-
71 and 57 -3a-72 of our Annotated Statutes, 1943, and 
under which the case of Swartz vs. White, 80 Utah pp 
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150-157, 13 Pac., (2) 643 evidently decided and which 
rPads in part as follows : ''Where the alleged owner 
of a car· rnerely has possession of the certificate of 
ownership indorsed in blank by the true owner, with no 
nante filled in, indicating the new owner, and he, in the 
presence of one advancing money to him on the car, and 
at request of lender signs his name in blank he acquires 
no title and he is merely borrowing". We believe our 
case is much stronger in favor of Peterson than was 
this cause in favor of the true o'vner, for here not only 
did Seamons and Andersons and of course the Valley 
Car Market have actual knowledge of the terms be-
tween Market and Peterson but no name of new buyer 
was ever placed in certificate of title and Peterson's 
signature was not even acknowledged before a notary 
before it came into the hands of Seamons some three 
weeks after the money had been advanced, as has here-
tofore been pointed out. And that Seamons himself 
placed his o'vn Notary upon said certificate after he 
received this as has also been pointed out. Mr. Seamons 
was therefore not a innocent purchaser without notice 
of ~uch facts to put him on notice for he knew, among -
other things, when he advanced the money that the 
\ 7alley Car Market did not claim to be the owner of said 
Mercury and that they had limited authority. 
We having received but $1400.00 on the Mercury 
there is yet due under the agreement with the Valley 
Car Market the further sum of $550.00. This would 
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work no hardship upon Sea.n1ons a~ under the testiinony 
of Bitter~~ one of the partner~ in the ~f nrket, he, Bitter~ 
and Nielsen "·ould have to u1ake up any loss that Sea-
Jnon~ n1ight sustain in the transaction ( tr. 99). .A.s to 
Bitters and Nielsen they can suffer very little for this 
is "·hat they have taken of the money received. 
$100.00 Finance money. 
$50.00 on Anderson check of $150.00 given for can-
cellation postdated check in the sum of $267.00 
$300.00 on Packard sale to Darley, Chrysler being 
valued at $150.00 by Nielsen as heretofore pointed out. 
$150.00 placed on Chrysler by Nielsen's own testi-
Jnony, as also heretofore pointed out. · 
$600.00 
To so1newhat reiterate our contention in this matter 
amounts to this: That Peterson, the owner of the Mer-
cury car took it to the Valley Market for said Market to 
sell, the Market to retain all over $1950.00 for and as 
their commission for selling same. (This is evidenced 
by Peterson retaining the title to said Mercury and other 
matters appearing of record and which has been pointed 
out in this brief). That the buyer, whoever he might 
be was not to be considered the owner of. said car until 
Peterson had actually received the $1950.00. That Sea-
mons and the Andersons knew of this agreement as 
has been pointed out. And that there is yet due and 
owing to said Peterson the sum of $550.00 from all of 
ll :-~aid parties severaly and jointly before either or all of 
f. 
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thexn can assert any claim to said Mercury now con-
verted into money, it having been sold by agreement of 
the parties in open court. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion we submit that a reading of the test-
imony, a review of the pleadings, the issues as pleaded 
or as formed in court by testimony will convince this 
Court that the Court below erred in not making find-
ings, conclusions and judgment against all the other 
parties and in favor of Mr. Peterson for the sum of 
$550.00. That this judgment should have been joint 
and several. If we are correct in this then we say that 
this Court should direct the Court below to make such 
findings, and conclusions so as to properly bottom a 
judgment in the sum of $550.00 in favor of said Richard 
Peterson. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARVEY A. SJOSTROM 
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